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he main news from the Russian judicial system over the past months has been the ratification 
by the Duma, on 15 January 2010, of Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This means that long-awaited reform of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) can now begin. This reform aims, inter alia, to improve the 
independence of ECHR judges, through the extension of their terms of office from six to nine years, 
and to speed up the handling of cases. Russia was the last of the 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe to ratify Protocol 14, and so it now enters into force for all member states. 
The State Duma of the Russian Federation first considered the question of ratification of Protocol 14 
in December 2006, but it failed to pass. The deputies who voted against it gave various technical and 
legal explanations.  
Why did Russia not ratify Protocol 14 for such a long time? And why has it now decided to ratify it 
after four years of delay?  
In interviews, state officials insisted that the Council of Europe had taken the Russian Federation’s 
opinion on Protocol 14 into account. In reality, however, this is impossible, because the Council of 
Europe could not have modified Protocol 14 after 46 other member-states had already ratified it. Only 
the authentic text of Protocol 14 could be ratified by the Russian Federation. The correct comment 
could be to say that Russia took into account the Council of Europe’s explanations (assurances) 
regarding the nature of reforms of the ECHR introduced with Protocol 14.  
When faced with the problem of Russia blocking the Protocol, it became obvious that the procedure 
for making such reforms of the ECHR had itself to be changed and made more flexible. At a seminar 
in 2008 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the Convention 
(which restructured the ECHR), participants agreed that in order to save the right of the individual to 
petition the ECHR, there would need to be reform, even without Protocol 14. It was suggested that the 
method of adopting Protocols should be abandoned in favour of procedural changes that the ‘Statute of 
the Court’ could handle. This would enable changes to be made to the working procedures of the 
Court without resorting to a complicated and time-consuming process of ratification of Protocols to 
the Convention. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe would introduce changes by 
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issuing resolutions without having to introduce amendments to the Convention every single time. But 
still there might be a possibility of blocking reforms if resolutions are delivered by unanimous 
decisions.  
Then on 30 April 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued Protocol 14-bis 
to the Convention. In general, Protocol 14-bis has the same aim and rules (regarding the speed of 
handling cases before the ECHR) as did Protocol 14. The major difference is that the rules of Protocol 
14-bis enter into force roughly three months after the date on which three High Contracting Parties to 
the Convention have agreed to be bound by the Protocol. There is no requirement that all 47 member 
states must ratify it, but it will be applicable only for those member states that do ratify it. And then 
Protocol 14-bis is withdrawn when Protocol No. 14 comes into force. Thus the Council of Europe 
continued to reform the ECHR through Protocol 14-bis without the consent of Russia. As a result, any 
deliberate (if indeed it was deliberate) blocking of reforms by Russia no longer had any effect. 
However, recent statements by the Russian President and other high state officials in conjunction with 
recent judgements by Russia’s highest courts indicate that Russia has ratified Protocol 14 in good 
faith. Notably, President Dmitry Medvedev, recently made the following statement:  
We are interested in improving our judicial system so as to make it effective and to create an 
environment where our citizens do not need to resort to international courts or, at the very 
least, will need to do so much less often. Our task is to create a national system, effectively 
ensuring justice in Russia. But this is not an easy process.
1 
This statement was also spread through mass media by many other politicians. For instance, the 
Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation, Alexander Konovalov, stated:  
Justice must be administered by taking into account the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
2  
It appears therefore that the political will to ratify Protocol 14 extended not only to reforming the 
ECHR, but also to improving the quality of the administration of justice in Russia. Thus on 26 
February 2010, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation delivered its judgement N 4-P, 
which stated that the parliament has the obligation to introduce ... 
a mechanism of execution of final judgements of the European Court of Human Rights which 
would secure adequate redress for violations of rights determined by the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
In theory, the Constitution of the Russian Federation has already stated the priority of norms of 
international law over national law. Nevertheless, until today, the opportunity to reopen a national case 
on the basis of a judgement by the ECHR has only existed for criminal and commercial cases. It was 
not recognised under the Civil Procedure Code. Since the Constitutional Court issued its judgement, 
however, the Duma must amend the Civil Procedure Code to introduce a mechanism to give effect to 
judgements by the ECHR against Russia. 
The Constitutional Court differs from other courts in its implementation of the Convention in its 
judgements. During the period following the accession of the Russian Federation to the Council of 
Europe on 28 February 1996 and before the ratification of the Convention on 5 May 1998, the 
Constitutional Court was the first one to implement norms of the Convention (when the Convention 
was not yet in force in Russia). Over this period of time, three Constitutional Court judgements have 
made reference to the Convention. By August 2004, 54 judgements had quoted the Convention. Of 
these, only 12 made reference to the case-law of the ECHR. The other 42 judgements only referred to 
norms of the Convention, which can hardly be called “implementation” of the Convention given that 
“States give effect to the Convention in their legal order, in the light of the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights.”
3 Since 2004, there have been some changes in the practice of 
implementation of the Convention by the Constitutional Court, which now refers to the Convention 
                                                      
1 Opening Remarks at Meeting on Improving the Judicial System, Gorki, 4 February 2010 (see 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2010/02/04/2105_type82913_224134.shtml). 
2 The Minister made this statement in evaluating the progress of efforts to reform the justice system in Russia. 
(see Aлександр Rоновалов выступает за новый облик Минюста. http://www.advgazeta.ru/newsd/110). 
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more often than before. At the same time, the quality of implementation of the Convention has 
improved.  
However the Constitutional Court is not the Russian judicial system. The question remains whether 
courts of general jurisdiction headed by the Supreme Court will follow the positive practice of the 
Constitutional Court? In fact, so far the Supreme Court has not applied the Convention with any 
degree of regularity or competence, despite the fact that the Supreme Court provided the lower courts 
with a special Regulation of 10 October 2003 on the application of international law. Although the 
Supreme Court started to invoke the ECHR’s case-law after 2003, it does so very rarely, with many 
faults and selectivity. Often the Supreme Court ignores issues raised by applicants invoking the 
Convention, or gives no substantial grounds for rejecting applicants’ references to the Convention. It is 
a curious situation in which a national Supreme Court, having issued a special regulation that orders 
all lower courts to apply the Convention by taking into account ECHR’s case-law, does not follow the 
provisions of its own document in its own jurisprudence. So there is little evidence of preventive 
application of norms of the Convention.
4  
Nevertheless, there are examples where the Supreme Court has implemented the Convention after the 
ECHR found that it had violated the Convention. In the first issue of its official Bulletin for 2010, the 
Supreme Court published a judgement of its Presidium on the application of the Convention. This 
specific judgement stipulates that a violation of the Convention is an admissible ground for reopening 
of a criminal case. And this case is not the only example of a case being reopened following a 
judgement by the ECHR that the Convention had been violated. 
In conclusion, we may hope that the full ratification now of Protocol 14 allows not only the beginning 
of a long-awaited reform of the ECHR, but also a campaign to improve the work of the Russian courts, 
and therefore provide fewer reasons for applications by individuals to the ECHR. The political will is 
demonstrated. There is evidence that the highest courts share this sentiment or, in other words, follow 
in practise the provision of Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution which establishes the superiority 
of international legal obligations.
5 The number of applications before the ECHR will be significantly 
reduced by accurately applying the principles of the Convention in light of the case-law of the ECHR. 
This implies that every case pending before a court of first instance would be considered through the 
prism of the Convention. It is crucial that the highest courts show a good example in the conduct of 
such practice. The other components of the Russian judicial system will then follow suit. 
The overall conclusion seems therefore to be a double one. On the one hand, Russia discovered that its 
attempt to block reform of the ECHR was becoming ineffective, since the other 46 member states of 
the Council of Europe had successfully devised a route to bypass its veto. On other hand, there are 
forces at work within the Russian judicial system and its political leadership who are committed to 
improving Russia’s domestic judicial system. They see that the reform of the ECHR could actually 
help that process. Why not make a virtue out of necessity, as the old saying goes?  
                                                      
4 For details on implementation of the Convention by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, see A. 
Burkov, The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights in Russian Courts (in Russian), Moscow: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2010 (http://sutyajnik.ru/bal/wolters). 
5 “The universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the 
Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the 
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agreement shall be applied.” 